Introduction: The transformation of the Army has now been underway for more than a year and is proceeding at a forced march pace. The transformation is said to be to a force that is lighter and leaner but more lethal and deployable. The vision is for this force to be ready for rapid deployment to any place around the globe. Since it will take years for the transformation to be completed, primary reliance in the near term will remain with the legacy force. It is too soon to know what if any impact the Rumsfeld review and the follow on Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will have on the Army’s transformation plan or its plans for the legacy force during the transformation. As part of the Army’s plan, one divisional brigade of the Guard has been designated for transformation to an intermediate brigade combat team. The role of the rest of the combat forces of the Guard as part of the legacy forces is unclear. None of the identified members of the task forces of the Rumsfeld review appear to have any expertise in Guard or Reserve matters. One suspects that their thinking may be imprisoned by the view that the Guard is a two day a month, two week a summer outfit with little capability to fight in future wars. How unfortunate for the nation that this sterile thinking continues
to exist and to impede the development of the full potential of the Guard’s combat forces. These forces are not relics of the Cold War but a very valuable national resource whose full potential should be developed and exploited. That means a plan for the transformation of the combat forces of the Guard.

**Short War, Long War:** Military thinking today is dominated by the view that our power must be projected rapidly in such strength as to overwhelm the opponent quickly. Military forces must be deployed in hours or days under this short war scenario with the whole affair over in 40 or 50 days. This thinking does not appear to arise from any study of history but seems to be derived from the consideration of futuristic technological innovations. While there is a healthy skepticism about this line of thought, the Army appears to have brought its transformation vision in line with it.\(^1\) There is considerable risk involved in structuring the nation’s military forces for such a short war scenario. Indeed, there is far more risk than the nation should accept. We should distinguish clearly those smaller scale contingencies, which do not involve the survival of the nation from the larger threats that do. Military forces that may be useful in the former will be inadequate for the latter. Our Army has never fought a war it planned for and, indeed, history shows that we have been very poor predictors of war. What has served the United States well in the past and will in the future are forces that have the flexibility to respond to the surprise that will surely come. The Guard provides the essential combat
forces to insure against that uncertainty. Any national military strategy, based on a big or small war, a short or long war, will require the combat forces of the Guard as a strategic reserve.

**Sizing the Guard as a Strategic Reserve:** Wars by their very nature are unpredictable, and postulating the nature of future wars is a highly uncertain and speculative exercise at best. The Guard’s traditional combat units will reduce the risk to our national security by continuing in its mission as the nation’s strategic reserve. The size of such reserve should be at least six Guard division equivalents. Anything less would put the nation at an unacceptable risk. This reserve would be needed in the event of a much larger war than contemplated in the short war scenario or in the event of an extended period of conflict resolution. These Guard combat forces remain the nation’s insurance policy and a powerful addition not only to its warfighting power but to its deterrent power as well. Whether the Secretary’s review accepts the need for the Guard as a strategic reserve or of what size it should be is not yet known. Past Congresses, however, have recognized the risk and insisted upon maintaining the Guard as a strategic reserve.

For the present and the foreseeable future, the risk is increased with the dismantling of major combat forces involved in the transformation process. Thus far, no persuasive reason has been advanced to cause the Congress to abandon its long held position of keeping the Guard as the strategic reserve.

For years, the Guard has urged that...
The strategic reserve is not only for the "Big One" that was not contemplated but also for a second warfighting mission: the short war that goes awry. Whether this development will be reversed by the Secretary's review or altered in a significant way is not known at this time. Nevertheless, all of the strategic reserve should have warfighting missions. How much of the strategic reserve should be specifically missioned for these tasks, what type forces they should be and how ready they must be can be developed within the existing Guard force structure after review of the CINCs warfighting requirements.

The strategic reserve would not only consist of the six division equivalents but would also have artillery, engineer, and aviation brigades and a cavalry regiment. The follow-on ready maneuver forces in the strategic reserve would be apportioned among the warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Under General Shinseki, the current Chief of Staff of the Army, this proposal has moved forward and the announcement of the assignments for at least four divisions has been expected. The CINCs have made known their warfighting requirements for these divisions. Whether this development will be reversed by the Secretary's review or altered in a significant way is not known at this time. Nevertheless, all of the strategic reserve should have warfighting missions. How much of the strategic reserve should be specifically missioned for these tasks, what type forces they should be and how ready they must be can be developed within the existing Guard force structure after review of the CINCs warfighting requirements.
be of light, heavy and medium brigades with a preponderance of heavy brigades. These brigades would be imbedded in the divisions and tasked with the reinforcement/follow-on mission. Since the short war scenario contemplates deployment in hours and days, the deployed forces would presumably be light or medium. Thus, while the reinforcement/follow on maneuver forces could be a light brigade or an intermediate brigade, the greater need would appear to be for heavy brigades to augment the fighting power of the deployed light/medium forces. These forces cannot be in the theater within the hours and days time line of the short war scenario, but they must arrive within the specified mission time lines, i.e., be ready for deployment within the specified days of mobilization. Heavy forces must be able to deploy and arrive in theater when their equipment arrives. Similarly, an artillery brigade will probably not be in the initial forces committed in hours or days, as the fire support will come from air or naval forces. The heavy artillery brigades can arrive later with their equipment. The same can apply to aviation or engineer brigades.

Since the short war scenario contemplates deployment in hours and days, these active forces would presumably be light or medium.

The critical issue for the Guard is to overcome the two-day a month, two weeks of summer mind-set and to put in place a rational plan that will produce highly trained, well led combat units that can meet the short time lines for deployment. The Guard can do it. The Guard can be as ready as the mission requires. But these follow on/reinforcement units must be organized and resourced for the mission.

Minuteman Combat Brigades (MCBs). The formation of Minuteman
Combat Brigades appears to offer the best structure to produce highly trained, ready units, able to meet the short deployment times. Minuteman Combat Brigades (MCBs) can be heavy, light, intermediate, artillery, aviation, engineer or a cavalry regiment. An MCB achieves its high degree of combat readiness through the high level of full time manning of leadership positions in its units. A light, intermediate, heavy brigade or cavalry regiment is manned full time at 30% of the authorized strength. This will fill two-thirds of all officer and senior NCO positions. The remainder of the unit is filled with traditional Guardsman. One third of all officer and NCO positions are reserved for traditional guardsmen to afford them careers and upward mobility. Within these percentages, many of the positions can be manned by either a full time or traditional Guardsman.

As an example, in the current 607 man Tank Battalion, there would be 202 full time personnel assigned. Of these, twenty-seven of the authorized forty seven officers would be full time, and one hundred seventy-five NCOs would be full time. They constitute the combat operational element of the battalion that trains on a daily basis. In addition, each unit has three full time administrative persons that take care of all of the administrative functions of the unit. Artillery, Engineer and Aviation brigades are manned full time at 20% of the authorized strength with half in officer and half in senior NCO positions.

The concept of the MCB visualizes all of the full time guardsmen of the operational element stationed at one
location. These personnel would live off the economy as present full time personnel do. The station must have all the ranges, facilities, and maneuver areas to support the training of all elements of the MCB on a daily basis. The MCB full time operational element will organize itself for training on a daily basis. This will involve considerable flexibility in assignments and cross-training. The MCB as a whole must be able to instantly form up with its traditional guardsmen into full strength units and to train as such on weekends. This means that all units of the brigade must be within easy traveling distance of the training location.

To assure that the requisite degree of combat readiness will be attained, the MCB should conduct three consecutive weeks of annual summer training. The MCB would conduct training at such levels as its necessary to achieve readiness for deployment.

Maneuver MCBs should be imbedded in the Guard's divisions. This will give a high assurance that the brigade will attain and maintain all standards in personnel strength and qualification, and will have the necessary training and logistical support. The division will have a large pool of qualified persons to draw upon in filling or replacing members of the MCB. The existence of an MCB in a division has a synergistic effect beneficial to the MCB and the rest of the division. The division, when called upon, can provide the trainers, the support personnel, and opposing forces. In addition to being a ready-to-go brigade, the MCB has the capability for rapid expansion. The Guard has always been the Army's force expan-

**The MCB as a whole must be able to instantly form up with its traditional guardsmen into full strength units and to train as such on weekends.**
sion capability. Imbedded in the division, the MCB can expand to create a fourth brigade by dividing its personnel in half and filling two brigades with trained guardsman or, if required, it can swap half of its personnel with another brigade in the division, creating two brigades that will be more ready in a much shorter period of time than traditional guard combat units.

The MCBs, its units and personnel must be held to the most rigorous standards. They would be expected to perform at a standard equal to like active units. With the support of the division they should be able to attain and maintain a high standard of readiness. These MCBs should have a METL developed under the guidance of the gaining CINC and should also conduct exercises with the active command. It is essential that the MCBs train to their warfighting mission. All of these actions will make the MCB more ready for deployment. Once an MCB has matured and demonstrates that it has met the requisite standards, it may be desirable for the operational personnel to be assigned on an individual basis to the gaining command. This will not only increase the professional knowledge of the members but will also reduce the stress on active member deployments.

MCBs would be available for peacekeeping missions like other guard units but should be more ready for deployment in a shorter train up period. MCBs, like other state guard units, would also be available for state emergency operations, including homeland security.
MCBs are very cost effective and affordable. While more expensive than a traditional Guard unit, they are far less expensive than a similar active force. As an example, an active tank battalion has a cost of $45.319 million while the cost of an MCB tank battalion is about half or $23.3 million. Thus, the Army can buy two of these for the price of one. That gives the Army more funds for transformation and allows its units to be converted to the intermediate combat brigade formation while at the same time increasing the combat power of the legacy force.

The concept of forming Guard units with a higher level of full time Manning is not new. The Army Guard has long envied the experience of the Air Guard and its higher Manning levels and its high state of readiness. The Commission on Roles and Missions in its report, after stating the doubts held by some of the ability of certain reserve component units to meet scheduled deployments, stated: "We believe that designated Reserve Component units can be ready in time if policies are changed and sufficient resources provided – for example, by raising the percentage of full time leaders, active duty advisors and skilled technicians in each unit." The German Army has followed a rather similar model to the proposed MCB for many years. In the German Army of today, the full time professional Manning of battalions is forty (40%) per cent which fills all officer and key NCO positions. The rest of the battalion is filled with conscripts who serve in the battalion for nine, twelve, or fifteen months. Conscripts

Minuteman Combat Brigades (MCBs) can be heavy, light, intermediate, artillery, aviation, engineer or a cavalry regiment.
Confidence and Competence. There is a high degree of confidence among Guard commanders that given the level of personnel manning recommended for the MCBs and with suitable stationing sites, the MCBs will meet or exceed expectations. The strength of Guard units has been the long service together of its members. This gives its units not only stability and continuity but develops deep bonds of loyalty among its members. This is the kind of bonding that gives units strength in combat. To these strengths, the MCB now adds a high degree of professional leadership and experience that greatly increases its readiness. These ingredients assure the success of the MCB. Its challenging mission will be met by its members, the modern Minutemen. The adoption of this concept will not only free up active forces for transformation and experimentation with futuristic designed forces but will also assure a legacy force of the size and competence that an uncertain future requires. It provides a new flexible force from existing structure that expands the range of forces to meet uncertainty.

The Way Ahead: A Time For Action. As the Army sets out on its journey of transformation, so should the Guard begin its transformation to...
meet the demands of the future. The Congress should provide sufficient funding for the Guard to form at least five MCBs, two heavy, one light, one artillery and one engineer. An aviation brigade should be formed as soon as sufficient aircraft are available. These newly formed brigades should be tested over a period of two or three years and any adjustments made to assure that they are at least as ready as any like active unit. These MCBs formed of modern day minutemen will continue to serve and be a part of the Guard’s tradition of service to nation and to state. The minuteman who served at the founding of the republic was the rapid response capability of the military strategy. The Guardsman of today has the same willingness to put nation above self and to respond as urgently as his forebears. All they ask is for the chance to prove that they are the equal of their forebears.

Endnotes

1. See General Eric K. Shinseki, The Army Transformation: A Historic Opportunity, Army 2000-01, pp 21-30. The General outlines his vision of placing a combat-capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in theater in 30 days.

2. See Major General Gerald T. Sajer and Colonel John VonTrott, Beyond Strategic Insurance, 11993 (unpublished). The authors lay out the benefits to the Army and the Guard of apportioning the Guard’s eight divisions to the CINCs as the international situation may indicate.

3. Estimate based upon Army Force Costing Model. Equipment-Trng Operations @220 days is $13.9 million. Personnel cost (616 personnel) is $25.4 millions. Other costs, contracts, etc. is $4.7 million, Health Care is $2.0 million for a total of $45.319 millions. The cost of an MCB is computed at: Equipment-Training Operations @ 70 days is $5.5 millions, Personnel Costs (202 full time guardsmen, 414 traditional guardsmen) is $12 million plus $3 million or $15 millions, Other costs, contracts, etc. is $2.0 mil-
lion and Health Care is $0.8 million or a total cost of $23.3 million.


Author's Biographical Information

Major General Gerald T. Sajer was the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania from 1987 to 1995. He enlisted in the Army in 1946, was commissioned at Fort Benning, and served in Korea during the occupation and during the war. He left the Army as a captain to attend Tufts College, graduating Phi Beta Kappa, summa cum laude, and holds a law degree from the Harvard School of Law and a masters degree in public administration from Shippensburg University. He was a general practitioner of the law, specializing in civil litigation from 1959 to 1987 in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, area.

He joined the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania National Guard, in 1959, serving as G-3, Chief of Staff, and Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1976 and to major general in 1987.