


Army Guard Strength: Getting it right this time

Minuteman Institute of National
Defense Studies

23 February 2007

Background:

When things are going well....



...expect friction to follow.

1903

1918

1919

1940

1944


1987

1992


1997

2001

2007




Six of the eight Allied divisions rated "most effective" by German Army GHQ are National Guard.




**US Army “March Plan” submitted to Congress;
proposes 500K Regular Army, 500K Reserve,
and eliminates the National Guard.**

1903 1918 1919 1940 1944 1987 1992 1997 2001 2007




18 National Guard divisions form foundation for expansion of the US Army from six AC divisions to 95-division force.

1903 1918 1919 1940 1944 1987 1992 1997 2001 2007




32nd ID first Army division in combat in Pacific; 29th ID leads the way on Omaha Beach

1903 1918 1919 1940 1944 1987 1992 1997 2001 2007





**LTG Leslie McNair drafts post-war
Army plan; eliminates National Guard**



"The 48th Brigade is combat-ready." MG HN Schwarzkopf CG, 24th ID(M)

1903 1918 1919 1940 1944 1987 1992 1997 2001 2007





1993 BUR
1995 CORM
1997 QDR

When relevance equals the TPFDDL equals the force....

“The eight National Guard divisions are not used in any major regional contingency currently envisioned in DoD planning scenarios [because] these conflicts will be finished long before the National Guard divisions can be ready.”

*Report of the Commission on Roles and
Missions of the Armed Forces, 24 May 1995*

How did we get here?

Congressman Aspin: “The Guard and Reserve keep telling us...don’t cut them, cut the Regular Army.”

General Sullivan: “...we cannot train people to fight in combat brigades in less than 90 days [or] divisions in less than 365 days.”

House Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993*, 22 February 1992

Answering the BUR and CORM

- 1993: RC Leaders' Offsite Agreement Reduce RC to 575
 - **ARNG 405 FS/367 ES; USAR 208**
- 1995: ARNG had 42 maneuver brigades
 - **15 enhanced Separate Brigades (1993 BUR)**
 - **24 divisional brigades**
 - **3 separate (AK, AL, PR)**
- 1996: Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS), Guard agreed to convert “up to” 12 brigades (42K) to CS/CSS structure
 - **Four phases of three brigades each**
 - **Each phase required revalidation of CS/CSS requirement and commitment of Army resources for conversion**
 - **Phase I went well**

The Low Point

1997 QDR: Without consulting Guard leadership, Army proposed 45K RC reduction (active component equivalent @3:1 to meet \$2B modernization requirement)

- RC Offsite at Fort McNair to deal with 37K ARNG/8K USAR
- ARNG agreed to cut 17K (USAR 3K) and defer “other 25K”
- ES only (DA Staff attempted later to revise to include FSA)

Congress notes with concern “the animosity and mistrust that exist between the Army and the National Guard” and directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army “does not treat the National Guard in a cavalier manner, ignoring valid requirements and intentionally under-resourcing the National Guard with the assumption that Congress will make up the shortfalls.”

*Conference Report on NDAA for
Fiscal Year 1998*

What is the right size for the Army National Guard?

- How much force structure can the Guard man?
- Is growth in the Guard necessarily an alternative to growth in the active Army?
- Should the Guard retain its dual-mission focus on the warfight or re-define the mission in favor of optimizing the force for HLS?

How much force structure can the Guard man?

- Through Cold War and beyond, Guard accepted risk inherent in maintaining FSA greater than ES
 - **Assumed P-3 deployment standard**
 - **IRR's only purpose was to provide fillers**
 - **Selective Service System still in existence**
- OIF/OEF/ONE changed rules
 - **P-1 deployment standard**
 - **IRR not a significant source of fillers for Guard units**
 - **Cross-leveling needed to fill subsequent rotations**
 - **Increased post-mobilization training time**
 - **Adverse impact on non-mobilized units**
- **New OSD one-year deployment policy will be difficult to implement if units aren't manned to mobilize at P-1**

How much force structure can the Guard man?

- FSA:
 - FY 07 —357,313
 - FY 08 —347,327
 - FY 13 —346,905
- ES:
 - Funded at 350K
 - Currently 347,465

Strategic choices

- When ES = FSA, units have difficulty maintaining P-1
 - **15-18% of unit newly assigned**
 - **NPS in/awaiting IET**
 - **Company grade officer shortage**
 - **Medical issues**
- 114% manning required to mobilize units at P-1 without cross-leveling.
 - **ES must increase to 396K if FSA remains at 347K**
 - **If ES remains at 350K, 114% manning requires FSA reduction to 307K**

Strategic choices

- Is growth in the active Army a threat to the Guard?
 - Is it a zero-sum game?
 - What if.....?

Strategic choices

Should the Guard retain its dual-mission focus on the warfight or re-define the mission in favor of optimizing the force for HLS?

- What is the requirement for a domestic-only force?
 - Manning
 - Training
 - Equipping
- Who would pay for it?
- What is the value of such a force?

Meeting DoD readiness goals to implement one-year mobilization policy

- Get the force structure and endstrength right, deliver ready units to the mob station
- Resolve equipment shortfalls
 - Re-set units
 - Modernize with the active Army
- Fully resource training and FTM
- Fix the mobilization process

Can the mobilization process be fixed?

To: Militia Headquarters, 19 April 1775

I have been informed that approximately 700 Redcoats under Major Pitcairn left Boston last night and are marching toward Concord with the intent of destroying our arms and ammunition stored there. Their route of march will take them through Lexington where I am prepared to oppose them with a company of 75 armed and ready Minutemen.

Your obedient servant,

John Parker

Captain, Massachusetts Militia

Headquarters Continental Army (Provisional)

18 May 1775

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Captain (MA) John Parker, Commander, Lexington Company,
Massachusetts Militia**
SUBJECT: Alert for Possible Mobilization

- 1. Your memorandum of 19 April 1775 has been referred to this office for response.**
- 2. Although the concept you have proposed is still in the staffing process and no final decision has been made, you are hereby alerted to anticipate potential issue of mobilization orders o/a 17 June 1775.**
- 3. IAW applicable draft Continental Army Regulations, upon mobilization, your company will be ordered to report to Fort Dix, New Jersey NLT 1200 hours 17 July 1775 for in-processing, personnel screening, records review, physical examinations, immunizations, weapons qualification and post-mobilization training/validation.**
- 4. This alert message is for planning purposes only and does not constitute authority to notify unit personnel or news media.**

For the commander:

**John Burns
Colonel, Infantry
Chief, Mobilization and Readiness Division**

Answers:

to be presented by other panel members